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We obtained the full genome of Middle East respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) from a camel 
in Qatar. This virus is highly similar to the human Eng-
land/Qatar 1 virus isolated in 2012. The MERS-CoV from 
the camel efficiently replicated in human cells, providing 
further evidence for the zoonotic potential of MERS-CoV 
from camels.
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a novel coronavirus that can 
cause severe lower respiratory tract infection in humans 
(1,2). MERS-CoV clusters with viruses in the genus Beta-
coronavirus; the closest relative to this virus is bat CoVs 
clade 2c (3). Although bats are believed to carry different 
CoV ancestors, antibody reactivity against MERS-CoV 
has been found in serum from dromedary camels from 
countries within the Arabian Peninsula (4–7), Egypt (8), 
and the Canary Islands (4). More recently, MERS-CoVs 
that phylogenetically cluster with human MERS-CoVs 
were detected in camels from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
Egypt (7,9–12). To further characterize MERS-CoV from 
camels, we screened nose swab samples from camels 
in Qatar.
The Study
In February 2014, nasal swab samples were collected 
from 53 healthy dromedary camels in Doha, Qatar. Af-
ter sampling, swabs were put into tubes containing viral 
transport medium and stored at -80°C until shipment to the 
Netherlands on dry ice, as described (9).
Total nucleic acids from nasal swabs were isolated 
by using the MagnaPure 96 total nucleic acid isolation kit 
(Roche, Mannheim, Germany), and samples were tested for 
MERS-CoV by using 2 TaqMan assays: 1 for the envelope 
(upE) and 1 for the nucleocapsid gene (N), as described 
previously (9,13). In each assay we detected MERS-CoV 
RNA in a sample from an 8-month-old camel. The cycle 
threshold of the positive sample was 12.9 in the upE assay 
and 11.3 in the N assay.
For further genomic characterization, RNA was iso-
lated from 50 μL of 1 swab sample with the QIAamp Vi-
ral RNA Mini Kit (QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany), eluted in 
60 μL water, and reverse transcribed with the Superscript 
III First-Strand Synthesis System (Life Technologies 
(Bleiswijk, the Netherlands) with random hexamers. The 
MERS-CoV genome was amplified by using MERS-CoV–
specific overlapping primer sets as described previously 
(3). Amplified MERS-CoV fragments were sequenced 
directly on both strands by using the BigDye Termina-
tor version 3.1 Cycle Sequencing kit on an ABI PRISM 
3100 genetic analyzer (Applied Biosystems, Bleiswijk, 
the Netherlands). To obtain the 5′ and 3′ ends, we used 
the FirstChoice RLM-RACE kit (Ambion, Bleiswijk, the 
Netherlands) according to the manufacturer’s protocols. 
Using overlapping sequence fragments, we assembled the 
complete MERS-CoV genome, except for 1 nt potentially 
missing at the 5′ end.
The genome was 30,117 nt long, including 12 nt at the 
3′ poly A tail (MERS-CoV camel/Qatar_2_2014, GenBank 
accession no. KJ650098). Similar to the genome of human 
MERS-CoV isolates, the genome of camel MERS-CoV 
isolates contains 10 complete open reading frames (ORFs) 
(ORF 1ab, spike, ORF3, ORF4a, ORF4b, ORF5, envelope, 
membrane, nucleocapsid, and ORF8b), 8 transcription-reg-
ulatory sequences, and 2 terminal untranslated regions. The 
alignment of the camel MERS-CoV with known human 
MERS-CoVs, including1 near-complete camel MERS-
CoV (NRCE_HKU205) sequence, showed overall nucleo-
tide identities of 99.5%–99.9% between camel and human 
MERS-CoV isolates from different geographic regions.
Phylogenetic analysis of the complete genome clearly 
showed that MERS-CoV camel/Qatar_2_2014 is highly 
similar to human MERS-CoV; the closest relative to camel 
MERS-CoV was England/Qatar1 2012 (99.9% identi-
ty) (Figure 1), and it was clearly distinct from the camel 
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MERS-CoV (99.5% identity) isolated from camels at a dif-
ferent location in Qatar and in Egypt (9,11). Comparison 
of spike protein amino acid sequences from various human 
and camel isolates showed that this protein is highly con-
served between this camel virus and other human isolates 
(online Technical Appendix Table, wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/20/8/14-0663-Techapp1.pdf).
In addition, most amino acid residues critical for recep-
tor binding (14) are identical in human and camel isolates, 
except for L506F in England/Qatar_1_2012. The biologic 
relevance of this mutation has not been investigated. The 
presence of arginine at position 1020 in the camel virus 
isolate might indicate that selective pressure at this site has 
probably not taken place as previously postulated. The fact 
that a MERS-CoV from a camel is highly similar to that from 
a human patient who probably became infected >1 year ear-
lier in the same region suggests that this virus is maintained 
within camel populations and further supports the hypothesis 
that MERS-CoV can be transmitted from camels to humans.
To test for the presence of infectious virus, we titrat-
ed the swab sample on Vero cells (ATCC no. CCL-81). 
After 48 hours, we observed cytopathic changes in cells 
(320 50% tissue culture infectious dose/mL). After 
isolation, the passage-3 virus stock was used for all subse-
quent experiments.
To check for adaptive mutations obtained during cell 
culture, we used 454 deep-sequencing technology (Roche, 
Indianapolis, IN, USA) to analyze the full-genome se-
quence as described elsewhere (3). A total of 57,655 se-
quence reads were obtained, of which 17,056 were specific 
for MERS-CoV, revealing ≈99.77% of the virus genome. 
Genome coverage ranged from 1 to 2,082 reads at single 
nucleotide positions. Gaps or regions with coverage of <4 
reads were confirmed by Sanger sequencing. When the ge-
nome of the passaged virus was aligned with the genome of 
the initial clinical isolate, we did not observe any mutations 
acquired during passaging.
To further functionally characterize this virus isolate, 
we subsequently inoculated human hepatoma (Huh-7) 
cells with MERS-CoV camel/Qatar_2_2014. After 2 days, 
virus-induced cytopathic effects were observed in the in-
oculated cell cultures (online Technical Appendix Figure). 
In addition, a strong increase in virus titer was measured 
in the cell supernatant (Figure 2, panel A); produced virus 
could be passaged (not shown). Virus production in Huh-
7 cells was blocked by preincubating camel MERS-CoV 
with a 1:200 dilution of serum from MERS-CoV antibody–
positive camels (9) but not with seronegative camel serum 
(4) (Figure 2, panel A). Infection of Huh-7 cells could 
also be blocked by preincubation of cells with polyclonal 
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Figure 1. Phylogenetic analysis of Middle East 
respiratory syndrome coronaviruses (MERS-
CoVs). Genome sequences of representative 
isolates were aligned by using ClustalW, and 
a phylogenetic tree was constructed by using 
the PhyML method in Seaview 4 (all 3 software 
packages can be found at http://pbil.univ-lyon1.
fr/software/seaview) and was visualized in 
FigTree version 1.3.1 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/
software/figtree/). Values at branches show the 
result of the approximate likelihood ratio; values 
<0.70 are not shown. The MERS-CoV isolated 
from a dromedary camel in Qatar in 2014 is 
depicted in a rectangle. Scale bar indicates 
nucleotide substitutions per site.
MERS Coronavirus from Camel, Qatar, 2014
antiserum against human DPP4 but not with control serum 
(Figure 2, panel A). Furthermore, transfection of nonsus-
ceptible MDCK cells with human DPP4 (Figure 2, panel 
B), but not with empty vector, conferred susceptibility 
to infection with camel MERS-CoV (Figure 2, panel C). 
These data demonstrate that the MERS-CoV obtained from 
a dromedary camel is able to replicate in human cells and 
uses DPP4 as entry receptor, similar to MERS-CoV iso-
lates obtained from human patients (15).
Conclusions
We isolated MERS-CoV from the nasal cavity of 1 
dromedary camel and demonstrated its infectiousness. Fur-
ther studies are needed to test whether camels infected at 
a young age are more likely than adult dromedary camels 
to excrete infectious virus, possibly because of the MERS-
CoV seronegative status of the younger camels. In addi-
tion, our results add to recent findings that MERS-CoVs 
from camels and humans are nearly identical (9–11). As 
might be expected from the high level of conservation in 
the critical interacting amino acids in the receptor-bind-
ing domain of the camel and human MERS-CoV isolates 
(online Technical Appendix Table), we show that camel 
MERS-CoV can infect human Huh-7 cells by using the 
same entry receptor as the human MERS-CoV isolates 
(15). Collectively, combined with the observation that the 
sequence of this virus was most closely related to that of a 
virus from a human patient who acquired MERS-CoV in 
Qatar a year earlier, these data support the hypothesis that 
dromedary camels are a reservoir for MERS-CoV and can 
transmit the infection to humans. However, whether expo-
sure of humans to camels directly can lead to human infec-
tion cannot be concluded from our data. We are not aware 
of a connection between the camel population sampled in 
this study and the patient infected with MERS-CoV Eng-
land/Qatar 1. Future epidemiologic studies are needed to 
investigate whether contact with camels or camel products 
constitutes a risk factor for MERS-CoV infection.
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Figure 2. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) from camel replicates in human hepatoma (Huh-7) cells and 
uses human DPP4 as entry receptor. Huh-7 cells were inoculated 
with camel MERS-CoV and left for 1 h. Next, cells were washed 
twice, and supernatant was collected at 2 h (open bars) and 20 h 
(closed bars) before being tested for MERS-CoV RNA by using a 
TaqMan assay. We analyzed control camel MERS-CoV–infected 
cells, cells inoculated with camel MERS-CoV in the presence of 
normal camel serum (NCS), MERS-CoV–antibody positive camel 
serum (Ab-positive CS), normal goat serum (NGS), and anti-
DPP4 polyclonal antibody–treated cells. Results are expressed 
as genome equivalents (GE), 50% tissue culture infective dose 
(TCID50/mL) (A). MDCK cells transfected with plasmid-encoding 
human DPP4 or a control plasmid (pcDNA) were stained with 
polyclonal antibody against human DPP4 (B) or inoculated with 
camel MERS-CoV and fixed 20 h after inoculation (p.i.) and stained 
for viral antigen (C).
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aAmino acid residues in the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS-CoV) spike protein that differ from the EMC/2012 isolate are displayed in red. 
bCritical amino acid in binding to DPP4 receptor, displayed in green. 
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Appendix Figure. Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) from camel replicates in 
human hepatoma (Huh-7) cells. Mock-inoculated cells (A) or cells inoculated with camel MERS-CoV (B) 
were fixed 40 hours after inoculation and stained with crystal violet. 
